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Connectivity, Legibility and the Mass Image
Sean Cubitt
 Abstract
Network connectivity should surely by now have already arrived at the global 
village. Instead, our only universal is the commodity form. To the extent that 
the actually existing global formation is universal, it does not constitute a cul-
ture. But if legibility is a hallmark of culture, the implication is that global con-
nectivity is illegible. The humanities alone are equipped to identify what is 
truly illegible, a task we perform precisely by reading, using every technique 
we have, eclectically, to find an entry into the opacity of events. In this chapter, 
Sean Cubitt argues that connectivity has produced a universal mass image, and 
asks whether it is possible to restore legibility to it, and if so in what forms.
The transition of film and television as discrete theatrical and domestic expe-
riences into ubiquitously available streaming video services brings a new form 
of exploitation and new aesthetics. Inhabitants of the wealthy North have be-
come highly skilled but also highly disciplined consumers of the mass image. 
The most intense site of consumer discipline was created in the capitalization 
of the World Wide Web and the rise of app culture, which now shapes the 
vast majority of interactions as commodities. The network condition frames 
moving image media and structures the modes of thought involved in their 
analysis. The perpetual surfeit and constantly tailored feeds of images respond 
to these technical and economic formations. Connectivity under these circum-
stances is no longer a need or a pleasure but an obligation.
If Raymond Williams’s thesis of culture as “a whole way of life” (1958a: xiv) 
were still true, network connectivity should surely by now have constituted 
a global village where cultural wholeness pervaded the species, or at least 
showed some signs of drifting towards it. Instead of culture, our only universal 
is the commodity form. To the extent that the actually existing global forma-
tion is universal, then, it does not constitute a culture. To the extent that leg-
ibility is a hallmark of culture, the implication is that the commodity form of 
global connectivity is illegible insofar as it is commodified. Humanities alone 
are equipped to identify what is truly illegible, a task we perform precisely by 
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reading, using every technique we have, eclectically, to find an entry into the 
opacity of events. This essay argues that the aggregation of uncounted mil-
lions of commodified images comprises a single, universal mass image. It asks 
whether it is possible to restore legibility to images today, thereby returning 
them to culture, and if so, in what forms. If culture in Williams’s sense is to 
become an option in our near future, such legibility – undertaken in the same 
Marxist and Leavisite traditions as he owned (Williams 1958b) – will be the 
necessary method for recuperating it.
 The Critique of Connectivity
In place of the old wants, satisfied by the productions of the country, we 
find new wants, requiring for their satisfaction the products of distant 
lands and climes. In place of the old local and national seclusion and 
self- sufficiency, we have intercourse in every direction, universal inter- 
dependence of nations. (Marx and Engels)
Thus, Marx and Engels in the Communist Manifesto (1848), already prefiguring 
the challenge to legibility that we face today in their phrase “intercourse in 
every direction.” As the humanities in the last quarter of the twentieth century 
gradually abandoned old canons of value based on a “civilization” more or less 
exclusively white, male and European, more positive terms like “connectivity,” 
“network” and “entanglement” added themselves to the negative virtues of “re-
sistance” and “subversion,” inspired in part by Deleuze and Guattari’s utopian 
concept of the rhizome (1967: 6 ff.). Today, however, the network condition is 
the site of a profound, even existential unhappiness. When many- to- many net-
works replaced one- to- many broadcasting, it was experienced as a liberation. 
Today, many- to- many has been replaced by the so- called social media mode 
of many- to- one communication. Not surprisingly, the “one” crumbles under 
its assault.
In the Communist Manifesto, capital’s global connectivity creates new 
needs that require, for their satisfaction, colonialism, imperialism and the 
ongoing violence of accumulation by expropriation (Luxemburg 1951; Har-
vey 2010). Our new need for a newer smartphone depends for its satisfac-
tion on the global networks of mining, fabrication, logistics, transport, 
retail, finance, debt and waste. In place of an older and perhaps poorer 
self- sufficiency, unhappy in its own way, we have universal connection by 
trade that produces new unhappinesses. The new connections disconnect us 
from the old locale. Networks of identity and lifestyle, peers and professions, 
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trading partners and fandom overwrite and dissolve local social connections, 
just as they overwrite and dissolve the lives of populations displaced by 
mines, sweatshop workers and the desperate poor who pick over the dump-
ing grounds of waste electronics. Branding makes these material networks il-
legible, burying the cultural forms of supply chains under the commodifying 
gloss of advertising and product design. Social media equally render illegible 
the disconnection of users from their material circumstances. Connection is 
also disconnection.
New needs are written over old desires. The connected individual is no 
longer herself, if “self” is a state where desire is shaped by its social repres-
sion. Network capital promotes a non- self liberated from socially and local-
ly formed desire. In place of desire it prefers to posit Marx’s “new needs,” 
which are not repressed but rather stimulated in order to be plugged into an 
unstemmable offer of tailor- made satisfactions modeled on the needs that 
capital has produced. The self is ab origine alienated by repression. Rather 
than being freed from alienation, the consumerist non- self is doubly alien-
ated:  first, as the repressed, desiring self, created by socialization; and sec-
ond, as the asocial non- self, alienated from the social whose repressions con-
structed it and its desire. Rather than freeing some original desire, the new 
need is constructed on its double alienation, as a satisfaction external not 
only to the self, but to the social. The repression that forms desire in its image 
is itself repressed in favor of a compulsory jouissance in the consumption 
of commodities. It is no surprise that this deracinated and doubly- alienated 
non- self yearns for and validates the very connectivity that has created it and 
its demand for networks.
The dream of a many- to- many constellation promised by the early internet 
failed to take the place of community when its actuality transpired as many- 
to- one. Promotional media encourage us to imagine smaller, more enclosed 
networks of parties and holidays, friendships and love affairs, in a community 
of the like- minded glimpsed in adverts and celebrity lifestyle reportage. We 
want to be connected to a place where people who would really appreciate 
me are already connected and waiting for me to join them. That is the fantasy. 
In reality, networks are immense technological infrastructures of optic fiber, 
server farms, satellites and transoceanic cables, microwave links and cellphone 
networks, rfid tags and barcodes, credit and loyalty cards, where machine- to- 
machine communication has already outstripped human- to- human commu-
nication (Cisco 2015: n. pag.) and it is impossible to distinguish between them. 
These networks are physically built, owned and operated almost universally 
by corporations. The information superhighway realizes Marx’s fantasia on the 
construction of roads, in which he perceives
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… the extent to which the socially posited needs of the individual, i.e. 
those which he [sic] consumes and feels not as a single individual in soci-
ety, but communally with others – whose mode of consumption is social 
by the nature of the thing – are … not only consumed but also produced 
through exchange, individual exchange. (1973: 532)
The peak moment of capital can be recognized when all social needs are ful-
filled neither by communities nor by states but by capital. Roads are a social 
need, but they are also vital to capital when the falling rate of profit forces ac-
celeration and massification not only of production but of distribution, and by 
the same token demands intense speeding- up of the physical act of exchange. 
All those minerals and sub- assemblies in our computers and phones, all the 
talent locked up in a completed movie, are nothing but costs to capital until 
they have been sold: the faster they are converted back into money, the bet-
ter. Therefore, Marx argued, capital would eventually take over infrastructural 
projects like roads, railways and canals (and, in our time, communication net-
works). Needless to say, having paid the piper, capital calls the tune: networks 
that serve its needs are the highest priority.
At the same time, the single most desperate need of the a- social subject of 
consumerism is for a community to connect to. When capital took over the pro-
vision of social goods, it was not only infrastructures like railways and telecom-
munications that were commodified but access to them. We purchase commu-
nication, which once was a local, social good, as a commodity. Connectivity 
moves from social good to goods and chattels. Society itself becomes just one 
of those needs that “are satisfied through the exchange form” (Marx 1973: 532). 
Today, the very possibility of society, having been shattered by consumerist 
individualism, can only be reconstituted through commodity exchange.
Commodification depends on the constitution of the world as a concatena-
tion of exchangeable objects that in turn depends on an ontology of objects. 
But their commodification unpicks the self- identity of objects on which that 
ontology depends. Under the division between use and exchange value, sign 
and attention value, and the implication of objects in one another and in their 
environments demonstrates their non- identity. The reality even of geology is 
split by the hyperreality of derivatives. The abstraction of behaviors and data 
from affects and relationships, and their simultaneous formal subsumption 
into commodities reduces all differences barring price differentials to the uni-
versal medium of exchange. Things are both themselves and their equivalence. 
In consumption, the social self is displaced by serial identities that never have 
to articulate, even within a single consumer. As recently as Solanas and Ge-
tino’s manifesto of Third Cinema (1971), it was possible to aspire to address 
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“the people.” Woe betide the academic or politician who speaks that way now. 
The work of network connectivity is to proliferate differences: to replace the 
social and its repressions, which produce both norms and the refusal and per-
version of norms, with an indifferent climate where every need is normative. 
The unity- in- difference of The People is no longer possible at any scale under 
these conditions. Connectivity substitutes for the sociable working of culture 
a market in acquaintance.
 The Mass Image
Such is the nomos underlying the condition of the production, circulation and 
consumption of images in the twenty- first century. But images are also actions 
of the logos. To understand the conditions of legibility and illegibility, we can 
no longer resort to modernist categories of ontology (an image is itself and 
other than itself by definition), epistemology (there is no longer a self capable 
of knowing) or of phenomenology (the encounter of image and subject no 
longer occurs in their co- presence but rather in their mutual absence, each 
of them already alienated from any pure or impure claim to being). We must 
instead turn to the clash of nomos and logos, the order of the law as it dissects, 
distributes and brings syntax to the spirit, the Word that, in John’s Gospel, was 
in the beginning, the word before flesh, before the separation of the light from 
the dark, the logos of primal mediation.
The energy needed to produce information has to come from somewhere. 
Any photograph is an act of destruction, the murder of the light that it docu-
ments. Unlike a drawn, painted or etched picture, making a photograph is trau-
matic. Even if laboriously set up and composed, a photograph rips a moment 
out of the flux of time. The truth it claims as a record of a moment comes at 
the price of no longer sharing the common fate of moments: change. In this 
sense, a still image is true to the extent that it is without meaning. It can only 
record and communicate a truth about the instant if it does not expound its 
significance. The being of the world, its truth, is outside of language. Drawing, 
painting and printmaking are significant acts that instruct us in the meanings 
of what they depict because they cannot avoid departing from verisimilitude 
in favor of style. In a photograph, contrariwise, whatever meanings it carries 
are properties of either the thing imaged or the person imaging (camera op-
erator or viewer), not of the entity “photograph.” So, many wonderful images 
made with the photographic apparatus are significant, but, like paintings, they 
are so to the extent that they abandon the claim to truth in favor of significance 
and to that degree abandon the calling of photography to realism, the “pencil 
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of nature.” The truth that “true” photographs lay claim to is the truth of an in-
stant ripped from the universal flow.
Moving images are an intuitive attempt to heal this trauma and restore sig-
nificance by supplementing each image with another. That the attempt has 
been fruitless is obvious from the fact that we are making movie after movie 
and still have not secured the significance of the world. Against the still pho-
tograph, its assassination of photons, its alienation from change, its whole-
sale adoption of nomos against logos and its traumatic flight subordination 
of time to Being; against all this, the moving image, by adding image upon 
image, sought to nurse the injured still back to health. But then moving images 
joined the proliferation of printed images and the electronic acceleration of 
circulation created the conditions for a new alienation: the mass image. Here, 
individual images lose their being, becoming instead ephemeral components 
of a far greater, even universal project.
After the attempt to heal it by the supplement of successive images and the 
modern art of motion between and within frames, the trauma of being that 
had triumphed in the still photograph returns in the collective, networked be-
ing of all images as facets of a single unchanging image of movement. At the 
same time, the condition of digital scanning and network latency is that the 
mass image of network media, although singular, is ephemeral. A selfie posted 
to Facebook risks a certain transcendence. In that instant of taking and post-
ing, you exist. But you exist as a quantum fluctuation in a statistically norma-
tive ocean. You have no eternity: only the ocean is eternal. Selfies are obsessive 
performances of the self precisely because the self is in crisis. The ephemerali-
ty of selfies, which makes them trivial in the regime of the traditional image, is 
the true aggregation of self, an identity, a lifestyle choice, a node in the social 
graph, in the twenty- first century. The ephemerality of contemporary images 
is their saving grace.
The world we have is unhappy; thus, happiness depends on negating what 
is given to us as the world. Images negate the world in order to produce pic-
tures that are more startling, richer, surer, more filled with meaning and more 
desirable than the world we have to inhabit. Even images of unhappy events at-
tempt to heal them. An image, any image, still or moving, that aspires to unity, 
aspires to happiness. The proliferation of images is a different matter. The new 
photographic ensemble of smartphone cameras and network communications 
captures, distributes, proliferates and aggregates images in immense numbers 
at immensely condensed speeds. This multiplication and acceleration of re-
cording and circulation sums up at stasis. When any image is exchangeable 
for any other, there is no longer any information or benefit to be gained from 
circulating more of them. Instead of negating the world, the mass production 
172 Cubitt
and exchange of images reproduces it in the form of its economic logic, draw-
ing each image into the commodity form as a preliminary to subsuming every 
image into exchange, abandoning the cultural project of legibility in favor of 
atomic commodities subsumed into the ocean of exchange.
The snapshot poses itself as a unique instant in time. Considered alone, as a 
unique instance, that is what it is. This is the kind of photograph Roland Barthes 
(1980) talked about in the discussion of the picture of his mother: unique, pre-
cious, significant and a presence tied to an absence, a lost but nonetheless real 
moment of the past. But when it is shared in gigantic databases (which Barthes 
avoided by not publishing the photo) and placed in relations of exchange with 
every other image, and when it also shares its GPS, facial recognition, histo-
gram and compositional parameters, it becomes not an instant but an instanti-
ation: a pixel in a pattern, an entirely predictable efflorescence of the universal 
image. In the mass image, every unique image loses its uniqueness at the mo-
ment its timecode and date stamp allocates it a place in a chronological map of 
time, a calendar which is no longer time- based but the translation of time into 
the spatial cartography of the calendar. In the Timaeus, Plato described time 
as “a moving image of eternity”: in the mass image, we see constructed an eter-
nal image of movement. Plato dismissed images from The Republic, we might 
say, for the same reason Socrates dismissed writing: the trauma of separation 
marks the legibility of time as trace divorced from substance. The eternity of 
the mass image erases the mark of trauma in a perfected eidolon, leaving no 
space for even the diagram of eternity that time provided.
Even though the individual image acts by negating the world, mass prolif-
eration of images produces a positive:  its own existence. Mass imaging’s re-
production of the world negates the single image’s negation of the unhappy 
world. It does not replace the unhappiness of exploitation and commodity 
exchange, because it reproduces it. The mass image – the huge composite pic-
ture of the world which is being assembled in databases at Facebook, Micro-
soft, Instagram and Google – employs humans to produce a universe of im-
age- commodities that we and others exchange, reproduce and consume. Each 
image taken negates the scene it captures and replaces it with an image. As the 
absolute number of images increases, the mass image replaces the entirety, the 
wholeness of the world, not just the unique scene. By the same token, a culture 
of compulsorily happy pictures necessarily negates happiness by replacing 
happiness with pictures. If there is one thing we know about happiness, it is 
that it is not single. The aggregate, singular, mass image negates happiness a 
second time by re- imagining it as normative, coherent, stable and universal.
A world of happy pictures is not a happy world, but it is unhappy in a new 
way compared to the unhappiness of the world it replaces. When each happy 
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image is consumed and replaced by dissatisfied desire, the individual images 
comprising the mass image are ephemeral. “Ephemerality” suggests that the 
images that negate changing events by replacing them with object- like hap-
py depictions ultimately negate themselves by disappearing. Ephemerality 
is the bubbling in and out of existence of consumable facets of a single, all- 
subsuming mass image. The goal of the mass image is perfect pictorial com-
munication, the absolute triumph of nomos over logos. And yet such perfec-
tion is by definition entirely predictable and therefore incapable of producing 
information. From within the logic of the mass image, the becoming- other of 
images is decay: mere noise, externality. Viewed critically, it is the noise of the 
unpredictable generation of the new.
Negation, as the philosophers use the term, implies that things are incom-
plete, unstable, inconsistent. For many contemporary philosophers, things do 
not exist, because they contain in themselves reasons why they are otherwise 
than themselves. What we think of as things are multiplicities (in the Marxist 
tradition) or becomings (in the Bergson- Whitehead tradition). The problem of 
the traditional image, which negates only to replace, is that it replaces change 
with a thing, an image, that contains in itself the reason why it is so and not 
otherwise. To the extent that the unique image does exist, it loses the pow-
er to change. An image that is, is present:  it is now (present) and it is here 
(presence). As a negation, an image puts its thing- ness in the place of some-
thing multiple and changeable, which it displaces. By occupying the present 
moment, and by extending that present moment across the entire lifetime of 
the image, an image, a still image, not only replaces things (multiplicities, be-
comings) but also replaces the kind of time in which things change. A painted 
paradise on a church wall promises to replace historical suffering with eternal 
bliss. Photography democratizes the eternal present that once belonged exclu-
sively to the saints.
The price of eternity is the trauma analyzed above, but it can be achieved as 
style, although, as Cocteau said, “Style is the enemy of journalism.” Expression, 
significance, beauty, the qualities of style that link it to subjectivity, are incom-
patible with its function as truth- bearer. The photograph as witness is forensic 
in its detachment, denying to the supreme subject of the mass image, the One 
who sees all, the possibility of taking that responsibility, which, for Benjamin 
(2003), constituted the legibility of history.
But even this witnessing is only feasible if and when the legible trauma of 
the excision from time is itself excised in the change of privilege from either 
journalism or style to circulation. In the 1990s, there arrived, in the form of the 
world wide web, a distribution medium of immense power that had almost 
no barriers to entry, barring easily acquired HTML coding skills. The utopian 
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moment of the early 1990s combined cheap video with the publishing, dis-
tributive and interactive capabilities of the web. Only after the shake- out of 
the dot.com crash in 2001 did it become apparent that a handful of net- native 
companies, notably Google, Amazon and eBay, had begun to create business 
models derived not from magazines and broadcasting but from the net itself. 
Those models – user- tracking and recommendations – provided the basis for 
social media through simple but monopsonic platforms (Mejias 2013: 33– 5). 
The result has been a landscape of tribes, as Maffesoli (1996) called them two 
decades ago, a fragmentary terrain of (often ephemeral) groupings around ce-
lebrities, catchphrases and brands, to which we donate our attention and cre-
ations, not only unpaid but self- funding consumers of a panoply of instantly 
obsolescent machinery and indifferent differences.
“Is it possible to differentiate between dominant and oppositional net-
works, for example? Or are they all so inextricably tied that even an analytical 
separation of them becomes useless,” so asks Arturo Escobar (2008:  11). His 
questions raise others, and especially in our context the question as to whether 
it is possible to rescue an oppositional agency for images on dominant plat-
forms like Facebook and Instagram. The first part of this question concerns 
whether network dissemination of images makes those images network me-
dia. Network media distinguish themselves in that they are in the first instance 
distribution media, where mechanical and earlier electronic forebears were 
first and foremost production media. Producing an image may well have eth-
ical consequences for those involved – artists and their models, news photog-
raphers and the people they image  – but those consequences may perhaps 
be diminished if the image is kept hidden, like Courbet’s Source and certain 
sacred images (of which Courbet’s may well be an example). Are we less guilty 
of what we fail to publicize? To have made the Abu Ghraib images made crim-
inals of those who made them (Scarry 1985; Sontag 2003); what status then for 
those who distribute them? If the answer is that it is in some way less terrible 
to share than to produce, then the ethical power of network media to demand 
responsibility for both making and enjoying images is diminished. Or am I too 
squeamish? Is it okay to turn away, to say “there are some images I never wish 
to see,” and so absolve myself of accountability for pictorial violence on the 
grounds that I didn’t look? If instead of showing, I share not the image but its 
transport, creating a network graphic on torture rather than pictures, is the 
diagram a technique for presenting my implication in the guilty truth without 
actually seeing it? Does the illegible statistical eidolon free me of my obligation 
to the one who suffers?
The inference for connectivity as principle and dilemma to draw from 
this detour through infographics is that the network relation, which is best 
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emblematized in diagrammatic rather than pictorial form, is that precisely 
because networks are not only self- documenting, they are also self- negating. 
A network node is a point of transit, not a terminus, even though, as nodes, 
each of us thinks of ourselves as terminal destination. Connectivity is entro-
pic: in network topography, every point is equivalent and equidistant, like the 
cosmic dust that, the cosmologists tell us, the universe will ultimately become. 
In this condition, all differences are indifferent. To distribute images of degrad-
ed victims is to degrade them further; not to circulate makes clear that their 
degradation cannot be separated from that of the immediate perpetrators, 
those who issued the orders, and the political regime that encouraged both 
the torture and the images of it. Abu Ghraib was already synonymous with tor-
ture under Saddam Hussain. The degradation is not specific to any one party. 
All humanity is degraded in this degradation; all humanity owes an unpayable 
debt to those who suffered at Abu Ghraib. Yet a dispassionate diagram of the 
images’ circulation, under the guise of meta- commentary, denies the condi-
tions of debt arising from both circulating and not circulating. The images are 
intolerable not only because of their prolongation of torture, but because of 
the impossible ethical demand they place on us. The diagram is intolerable be-
cause it does not make that demand. Is it the case that the network condition 
of circulation in itself removes the ethical demand?
The same problem of non- identity I noted about objects, and the same scale 
of ethical demand, is also the case with nodes, with the same ethical implica-
tions. Here is Michael Dieter’s thumbnail description of a smartphone:
Here, interfacing can include a range of active relations such as tap detec-
tion, fingerprint identification, the operation of cameras, microphones, 
gyroscopes, accelerometers, vibration mechanisms, operating systems, 
location services (GPS), Bluetooth and, crucially, the oscillation of lith-
ium ions as battery life. (166)
If to this we add the operation of software, apps and the actions of the hu-
man user, including their relation to the space, physical and social, where they 
interact with the device, it is clear that the network node is itself a network, 
indeed a network of networks that includes the user’s biography, the environ-
mental implications and the supply chains that bring the various components 
together. Any concrete instance has always been the solid instantiation of an 
incalculable number of inputs. As network node, the human- device interface 
is also centrifugal, at best a momentary focal point through which biography 
and data flows draw themselves to an illegible point in order to diffuse again 
in multiple directions. The non- identity of the network node is produced as 
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a network effect, a point traveling through time, and necessarily ephemeral, 
a compound lens assembled and disassembled on the fly to focus, conform 
and retransmit. This pseudo- self, like Descartes’s pineal gland, is a channel for 
assembling and mutating, whose task is to supply idiosyncratic combinations 
and inflections to a system that otherwise is too deeply standardized to pro-
vide its own. This is the role of disciplined consumption, where street cultures 
and lifestyle groupings reconfigure the symbols that claim their attention, now 
a form of labor, in order to renew the circulation of commodified affects. This 
work of (re)processing symbols is indistinguishable from the work of code: il-
legible because it is not written for human comprehension, because it is not 
writing as text but writing as process and because there is no referent, no use- 
value, only oceanic exchange. In this role, the non- self ’s value lies in the data 
it processes.
The work of disciplined consumption and prosumption is not only unpaid 
but demands investment in kit and connectivity. Here, it performs the only 
truly terminal task of contemporary capital and the last authentication of the 
historical self: to be the subject of debt. Debt is incurred by spending future 
earnings today. In the last instance, all debt must be repaid by the individuals 
that capital has created as its debtors, but the lonely hour of the last instance 
never comes. The moment when debts are finally reconciled, the moment 
when the commodified self will be finally realized, never arrives.
The self, perpetually deferred, is not identical with itself. But neither are 
networks. The networking experience is not an experience of network infra-
structure, which today is characteristically hidden beneath shiny interfaces. 
Bots and cookies, Facebook’s social graph, and Google’s user profiles are en-
couraged by widespread ignorance of how the internet works, which is a func-
tion of “user- friendly” design and the universal disguise of and blindness to 
the physical labyrinth of cable, switchers, routers, servers and server farms we 
disingenuously refer to as “the Cloud.”
 Against Connectivity
Connectivity, which appears to us in fantasies of belonging, depends on the 
interactions of a corporate network, whose economics, politics and cultural 
forms are structured by the commodification of the social good. It is pre-
mised on and constructs non- identical and atomized subjects, psychologi-
cally, economically and environmentally predestined to pay in the future for 
its operation today. Connection is not a solution: in its current form, it is the 
problem.
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At the same time, it is vital not to confuse connectivity with implication. 
I have dropped the word “implication” into my text a few times already. Now 
it is time to define it. Latour argued in his Oxford lectures that networks are “a 
tool to describe something, not what is described” (2005: 131). His statement 
was not a statement about the internet, but about an ontology of the world as 
flux. The metaphor of networks took hold in the post- war Macy conferences. In 
its current form, it covers human artefacts like the internet, the de facto ontol-
ogies of the 21st century – ecological and quantum science – and the Market as 
quasi- natural emergent form underpinning all human relations and dominat-
ing contemporary political life. Latour’s comment makes clear that the appli-
cation of a technical metaphor to non- human realities is just that: a metaphor. 
As metaphor, it is a translation, a communication of incommensurable terms 
between languages and across time. For cybernetics, the translation problem 
would result in what Orit Halpern calls “a statistical grammar of prediction” 
(2014: 51), of the kind that now dominates the day- to- day circulations of the in-
ternet. In engineering, however, metaphors and translations are performative. 
Connectivity translates a condition of statistical probability into the operating 
principle of packet- switching networks, which return the favor by providing 
a metaphor for themselves and for the financial trading that constitutes the 
larger part of internet communication today.
And yet there remains a “something” that we are trying to describe with our 
network metaphor, and which the internet as performative metaphor might 
be defined as attempting to describe. Of the available terms (entanglement, 
enfoldment and many more) I  like “implication” because it catches at once 
the “pli” of Deleuze’s Leibniz (1993) and the remnants of causality, while at the 
same time evoking just that ethical sense which I have argued is disabled by 
current network communications. Non- identity is only a problem when iden-
tity is the sine qua non of many- to- one networks and of the architecture of 
debt, that is, when it emerges from the construction of capitalist individuality. 
Ethical demands produce a special angst when they arrive at the point of in-
dividual responsibility, when individuality, like the family institution before 
it, is in crisis. In connectivity, there is no place for shared responsibility, which 
falls on the helpless shoulders of an individual self so constructed as not to be 
able to bear it. Implication indicates an alternative to this situation. Reversing 
debt’s predetermination of an endlessly deferred but ineluctable future, we are 
all indebted to our ancestors and our planet, all implicated in one another.
Mediation implicates us not only in the doings of other humans but in the 
local and cosmic environment. Sunlight and rock, water and plants are me-
dia implicating us in the world. All the media we are implicated in implicate 
themselves in us. Historically, the free and open internet of the early 1990s was 
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built on an infrastructure that was anything but common. Enclosure of the 
digital commons was to that extent a foregone conclusion. But underlying the 
infrastructure of the internet lies an older, broader commons that combines 
physical processes with the accumulated technical know- how Marx called “the 
General Intellect,” itself enclosed and privatized in technologies. These layers 
of commons and enclosure create the internal contradictions that at once pro-
vide a critical foothold in the network and an escape route from the isolation 
of the network condition, at once through recognition of the implication of 
each human in every other and through the natural and technological process-
es that the political economy of the contemporary network excludes.
Moving image cultures are inhabited by the network condition as much as 
they inhabit it. Film and media studies’ embrace of larger fields of making, 
sharing, viewing and using moving images enrich our understanding of the 
networks they inhabit and in many senses constitute. Precisely for this reason, 
critique of connectivity and the mass image is becoming a pressing issue. The 
challenge of legibility is then to confront the loss of significance in the traffic 
in data, without, however, returning to a hieratic semantics grounded in the 
authority of God or Man. The space between significance and the asignifiant is 
not a void but a sliding scale. We have a long job of work ahead to distinguish 
a- signifying primal mediation from ordered communication, and both from 
what we must now inhabit, the insignificance of components of the mass im-
age. Work at the level of the single image, its atypical and unstable grip on be-
ing and reference, and its always particular articulation with the connectivities 
it emerges from and impacts on is the particular and crucial political- aesthetic 
task of the humanities in the early twenty- first century.
With thanks to Roberto Mozzachiodi.
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